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ABSTRACT 
This Daper examines the current method of taxation and 
control of the coffee industry in Kenya and outlines an alternative 
system aimed at improving the industry's efficiency. Control of the 
industry has been exercised through a system of acreage quotas 
which have been fixed since 1963, and taxes have not been made 
sufficiently sensitive to the wide fluctuations in income in good 
and bad years. A system of volume control is proposed which 
incorporates a more flexible system of taxation and should encourage 
a change in resource allocation to allow production of the desired 
national coffee output at a lower opportunity cost. The implications 
of this new system are examined for coffee estates and small-
holdings , and the effects on employment and net foreign exchange 
earnings are discussed. 
TAXATION & CONTROL OF THE KENYA COFFEE INDUSTRY 
Kenya is a high cost producer of coffee.1 This paper examines 
the current method of taxation and control of the coffee industry in 
Kenya and outlines an alternative system aimed at improving the industry's 
efficiency. 
THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF TAXATION AND OUTPUT CONTROL 
Output Control 
Output of coffee in Kenya is controlled primarily by controlling 
the area of land on which coffee may be produced. This control is 
exercised through a system of acreage quotas which were allocated 
in 1963, by the simple means of making the acreage under coffee at 
that time the permitted acreage. As planting is allowed for replace-
ment purposes only, the number of trees per acre cannot be increased, 
and increases in output can only be achieved by increasing output per 
tree, Uprooting is permitted, but a grower is discouraged from so 
doing by the costs involved, and more recently also because loans 
have been raised on the security of land and coffee trees. 
Taxation Policy 
Taxes Specific to the Coffee Industry: Taxation of the coffee 
industry has served primarily as a source of local and central government 
revenue, and has not been actively used as an instrument for 
controlling the output of the industry. Two taxes specific to 
coffee growers are currently levied. The Government Export Levy 
is a central government tax while the Local Authority Coffee Cess 
is a source of revenue for most county councils. 
1, International comparisons show that during the lower world 
prices of previous years, many countries were still able to levy very 
heavy taxes on their coffee industries. For example Columbia - one 
of Kenya's major competitors - was able to levy over the last decade taxes -
which reduced Columbian wholesale prices (which are higher than 
producer prices) to between 39% and 68% of export unit price. If 
taxes of this magnitude had been levied on Kenya growers over the same 
period many growers would have been forced to cease production. 
Arguments that such figures are not valid because Kenyan growers 
pay much higher rates of taxation on their profits are themselves 
not valid. There is a great difference between paying at least 39% 
of gross revenue as tax and paying less than 6% of gross revenue 
and then a maximum of 40% of net profits as tax, as Kenyan growers have 
been doing. 
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The Government Export Levy is levied at a rate of £10 
per long ton regardless of quality on all coffee which is exported to 
International Coffee Organisation quota markets. In 1968/9, this 
represented for grade two coffee a tax of 2.18% of the f.o.b 
Mombasa price and 2.51% of receipts by growers for coffee delivered to 
Nairobi. For grade four coffee these percentages were 2.61 and 3.07, 
and for grade six coffee 2.98 and 3.58. The levy is deducted on 
behalf of the Government by the Coffee and Marketing Board before 
payment is made to growers. It was first introduced on May First, 1964-, 
at a rate of £20 per long ton, and was cut to its present level on 
July First, 1967. in 1968/9, the revenue from the tax of £407,320 
comprised 0.62% of total Central Government gross revenue from 
taxation. 
The Local Authority Cess, based on the value of coffee 
when purchased by the Coffee and Marketing Board (CMB), is levied 
by most County Councils. The bulk of the cess is collected centrally 
on behalf of the County Councils by the CMB. All cesses collected 
by the Board are levied at a rate of 3% on the net payments the 
Board makes to growers before deducting milling charges and agency 
fees. The cess is normally therefore a little more than 3% of the 
value paid to growers. The total value of the cess collected through the 
Board in the years 1968/9 was £251,167. No accurate figures exist of the 
value of the cess collected by County Councils who do not collect 
through the Board. Estimates can be made however by applying the cess 
rate to the value of washed coffee delivered to the Board from each 
of these areas. 2 This adds a further estimated £77,206 to that 
collected by the Board to give a total cess value for 1968/9 of 
£328,373. 
Acreage under coffee in Kenya is fairly evenly divided 
between large estates and smallholdings. In 1970 the estate sector 
produced 26.7 thousand metric tons compared with 32.0 thousand in 
the smallholder sector. The smallholdings which are virtually 
entirely African owned are organised on a co-operative basis. 
2. The estimate of cess collections can be determined simply 
by applying the nominal cess rate to the product of the price paid 
per tone for each grade of coffee and the tonnage of that grade 
produced. 
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On average, the smallholder sector pays an estimated 0.3% 
more of its gross revenue to local authorities in the form of the 
cess than does the estate sector. The main reason for this is that 
more estates than co-operatives are in City Council areas (notably 
Nairobi City Council) where the cess is not levied. Secondary 
reasons are firstly that some estates have managed to gain special 
exemption from the cess, and secondly that, by virtue of their 
location, all the cess levied on estates is collected through the 
CMB who for administrative reasons do not levy the cess on buni. 
Taxes Not Specific to the Coffee Industry: In addition to the above 
taxes which are specific to the coffee industry, growers are also 
subject to the general range of direct and indirect taxes and sub-
sidies in Kenya, We do not intend to discuss this whole range 
because their economy-wide nature prevents them from being 
part of an explicit policy to control the coffee industry. We feel, 
however, that it is relevant to examine the differential impact of 
direct taxation on the estate and smallholder sectors because as 
a result of the differences in size and ownership net income in the 
estate sector is taxed under a completely different system from that 
of the smallholder sector. This anomaly can only be eliminated by a 
change in the pattern of ownership of the estates or smallholdings 
or by a change in the overall system of direct taxation in Kenya, 
and the anomaly is of sufficient magnitude to be taken into account when 
such changes are being considered. 
Most estates are run as companies and as such pay 
corporation tax on their net profits. Individuals or partnerships 
who own estates pay graduated personal tax (GPT), income tax and 
surtax on their salary from running the estate plus their share of the 
estate's profits. Smallholders normally pay GPT only. Cooperative societies 
are exempt from any form of income taxation provided that the gross 
income of the society divided by the number of members does not 
exceed K£150. 
GPT is payable by all persons with an annual income in 
excess of £4-8 per annum. Amounts payable increase in blocks from 
shs. 48 annually on incomes of £48 per annum to a maximum of shs. 600 on 
incomes of £600. As a result of the rate structure GPT varies over this 
range between 2.5% and 5%. Incomes of over £600 are not subject 
to further increases in GPT and percentage liability to GPT decreases 
as incomes increase. A smallholder would normally fall somewhere 
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within the £48-£600 per annum income range, his actual liability 
to GPT being assessed by a local committee of chiefs and sub-chiefs. 
Methods and the accuracy of assessment tend to vary between districts, 
but the basic method used for coffee smallholders is to assume that income 
from coffee varies directly with acreage under coffee. Thus, for 
example, in Kiambu district a smallholder is assumed for GPT purposes to 
receive annually an income of K£90 from each of his acres of coffee. 
This method of assessment if closely followed would mean that GPT 
is a tax on one of the smallholder's inputs rather than his income.. 
However in 'bad' years when growers are making little or no profit 
on their coffee, the assessment committee is loath to levy the full 
amount of tax calculated using the acreage method, and tend to levy 
less than this amount. The tax tends to be in practice therefore, 
a function of both a smallholder's acreage and his net income, the relation-
ship depending on the current profitability of coffee and the attitudes 
of the assessors. The central administration of the GPT system has 
recently moved from the Ministry of Local Government to the 
Treasury and is attempting to move away from the estimation of income 
using acreage under coffee to a system where some attempt is made 
to assess the true net income of smallholders. No equitable system of 
GPT assessment could be based solely on income from coffee because 
the tax rate is a function of income aggregated from all sources, and most 
smallholders also derive income from other crops and often from 
other (often salaried) employment. However since smallholders 
market through their cooperative, their gross income from coffee can be 
determined from the cooperative's accounts ,, By taking this income 
into account the assessment committee could make a more accurate 
estimate of net income from coffee than the present estimate based 
solely on acreage. 
Estates run as companies pay the corporation tax rate of 4-0% 
on their net income, while estates run by individuals or partnerships pay GPT 
and income tax and surtax at progressive rates ranging from 12^% 
on their first £1000 of taxable income to ll\% on taxable incomes 
of over £15,000. Taxable income, for income tax and surtax purposes, 
is a function of family size, with tax allowances varying from £216 for 
a single man to £960 for a married man with four or more children. 
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The rates of income taxation in the estate sector are 
therefore much higher than those of the smallholder sector. The 
highest tax rate on the incomes of smallholders is 5%, compared 
with the 40% rate of corporation tax paid by company owned 
estates. For example, consider a co-operative society made 
up of 250 members each with annual net income of K£140. Its 
members will each pay K£3.-6 GPT annually - a rate of 2-6%, In all 
they will pay K£900 GPT on a total income of K£35,000. If a 
similar net income accrued to five company owned estates, each estate 
would receive a net income of K£7,000 and would pay K£2,800 
corporation tax. Together the five estates would pay K£14,000 
corporation tax. In this example the rate of taxation of estate 
income is 15.6 times that of smallholder income, If the estate were 
privately owned this ratio would be 16,0, if the estate were owned by 
a single man, and 13,4 if It were owned by a married man with four 
children. 
This example assumes that smallholder Income is 
determined accurately for GPT assessment, but as we described earlier it 
is usually assumed to be a direct function of acreage with 
possibly some subjective modification by the assessor. Thus in 
'good' years the average income tax rate difference between estate 
and smallholder may be even higher. In 'bad' years It will tend to be 
lower. Rates will be equal at some low overall level of coffee pro-
fitability, and In exceptionally bad years when profits on estates 
fall to near or below zero, the average rate of Income taxation 
on estates will be lower than on smallholdings, The level of pro-
fitability at which the rates of taxation are equal cannot be 
readily calculated but will depend on how close Is the Income level 
assumed per acre for GPT purposes to the 'true1 net income of an 
average year, the size distribution of smallholdings and how much 
the assessment committee lowers the amount of taxable Income assessed on 
coffee acreage in a 'bad' year. However taking good and bad years 
together over a long period, it is likely that the average effective 
income tax rate on estate profits will be much higher than that 
on the profits of smallholdings, 
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THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE OUTPUT CONTROL AND TAXATION POLICIES 
Throughout the discussion we will assume that it is to 
3 
Kenya's advantage to produce sufficient coffee to fulfil the ICO quota. 
This assumption is likely to be valid given present world prices, 
but as Kenya is a high cost producer of coffee it might be preferable 
for high opportunity cost growers to withdraw from the industry 
if a lower long-run world price is projected. 
The present system of acreage quotas in effect prevents 
new acreage from being brought into coffee production and also 
prevents an increase in the number of trees per acre by the ban 
on new planting. The latter factor is unlikely to be as important 
as the former because a change in the intensity of trees per acre, 
even in the absence of any control on planting would probably require 
complete uprooting and replanting as trees could not be added or 
subtracted from the present layout in an efficient manner. It is 
unlikely that any grower who discounts future returns either explicity 
or implicity would consider this worthwhile. 
3. This assumption does not imply a single particular level 
of acreage under coffee, as yield per acre fluctuates greatly from 
year to year with factors such as disease and rainfall. To be 
certain of filling the quota every single year, a very much higher 
acreage would need to be maintained than is necessary to produce 
the quota in a normal year. Surplus coffee can only be sold to a 
very limited extent on the domestic market or can be sold to non-
quota markets at prices which are normally much lower than those 
obtainable in quota markets. The actual output goal-will therefore 
be a compromise taking into account the lower prices obtainable 
in non-quota markets and the disadvantagesj such as a reduction in 
future quotas, of failing to produce the quota output. 
4. This however, does not imply that if acreage had been 
allowed to enter and leave the industry, the resulting intensity of 
trees per acre would not have changed. 
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It is very unlikely that the ban on new planting has led 
to the most efficient allocation of acreage to produce the ICO 
quota at the lowest opportunity cost. The present allocation will 
only be efficient if it was efficient in 1963, when planting was 
banned, and production and demand conditions have not changed, 
or if it was not efficient at the time of the ban, but conditions have 
changed so as to make it efficient. The possibility of the latter 
happening fortuitously throughout the coffee sector can be dis-
counted. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that the distribution was 
optimal in 1963, because of the rush of planting on any available 
land which occurred in 1962, just prior to the ban. Furthermore, 
it is certain that production and demand conditions have 
changed. For example, the ICO quota quantity and average world 
price have risen, and the price differentials between coffee of 
different standards have narrowed; sprays and fertilizers have 
improved, the incidence of disease has increased, management has 
changed hands and labour costs have risen. The present rigid 
system of output control using historically determined acreage 
quotas is therefore likely to be preventing the development of the 
optimal distribution of acreage under coffee able to produce the 
ICO quota output at the lowest opportunity cost. 
The fixed rates of export tax and local authority cess are 
likely to have led to further inefficiencies. Despite many changes 
In both world price and average production costs caused mainly by 
changes In the incidence of disease, the rate of export tax has 
been changed only once in eight years. The result has been that 
in years of high costs and/or low world prices, when the average grower 
has had small profits or even losses, the two taxes have reduced 
his net income by a further 5,6% of gross income. This may 
reduce his cash reserves to a level which prevents him from 
spending the optimum amount on field maintenance and leads to a 
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reduction in efficiency and future net returns. In good years the 
fixed rates of taxation allow net income to increase sharply and 
leave an important source of Government revenue untapped. These 
adverse effects are exaggerated by the fact that the export levy is 
not an ad valorem tax, but is levied per ton of coffee, with the 
result that the rate of tax expressed as a percentage of gross income 
falls as world price increases. 
Thus, neither the taxation ...or output control policies are 
consistent with an efficient coffee industry. We now examine an 
alternative system of volume control which incorporates a more 
flexible system of taxation, and should encourage a change in 
resource allocation to allow the production of the desired national 
coffee output at a lower opportunity cost. 
A NEW SYSTEM OF OUTPUT CONTROL. 
We will assume in the initial discussion that the main aim 
of the new system is to encourage the production of Kenya's ICO 
quota quantity of coffee at the lowest possible opportunity cost. We 
subsequently examine its likely impact on employment levels and 
net foreign exchange earnings. 
5. As with all types of production it is impossible to divide 
the costs of coffee growing into fixed and variable elements, because 
the division varies according to the time period being considered. 
In the industry, a traditional accounting division is made between 
'picking cost' which vary with the size of each crop and 'field maintenance 
expenditures' which include such items as weeding, mulching, pruning and 
disease control. The latter includes expenditures which determine 
the size of both current and future crops, the most important of which 
is the expenditure on disease control. There appears however, to be 
a minimum level of field maintenance expenditure, which varies from 
year to year depending primarily on the incidence of disease, and which, 
if not met, causes future yields to fall sharply. Field maintenance 
costs are fixed only in the very limited sense that growers try to 
maintain at least this minimum level. The optimum level of field 
maintenance for each grower would be that level which maximises his 
discounted present and future net returns. This level is likely 
to be at least equal to the level below which future yields fall 
sharply. 
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To encourage the efficient allocation of resources, which is 
necessary to encourage production at the lowest possible opportunity 
cost, the new system must have two features which are absent from the 
present system. Firstly it should allow a flexible composition of 
land under coffee, so that the composition of capacity can adjust 
to meet changing conditions, and secondly it should prevent violent 
fluctuations in the growers' net incomes, This latter feature 
Is vital for the long - run efficiency of the industry, because 
of the need to maintain levels of husbandry above certain minimum g 
levels. Planning and cash reserves are limited, particularly In the 
smallholder sector, and a regular income is therefore a pre-reauisite 
of efficiency. In addition, a more regular income would reduce the 
riskiness of coffee growing and would make a lower level of return 
acceptable to growers, thus increasing the tax capacity of the 
industry. 
The level of demand to enter or leave the industry is 
mainly determined by the potential net revenue which can be earned from 
coffee growing, If this could be maintained at a level which 
encourages a net flow of capacity into or out of the industry just 
sufficient to maintain the capacity necessary to produce the ICO 
quota, acreage quotas could be abolished. Thus, if a flexible tax, 
7 
similar to the present export tax, could be used not only to 
stabilise net returns to growers, but to stabilise them accurately 
at this desired level, capacity could be controlled by the tax alone. 
However, empirical knowledge of the way costs fluctuate from year 
to year with changing yields, disease levels and climatic conditions is 
still very limited, and a tax of the required sensitivity could 
g o See footnote 5. 
7, The tax at present is levied only on exports to quota 
markets, Since growers market their coffee through the Coffee 
Marketing Board which then sells to domestic, quota and non-quota markets, 
the tax does not encourage sales to domestic or non-quota markets. 
Ideally the tax would be levied on all output, and would also replace 
the Local Authority Cess, The latter change would reduce collection 
costs, would widen the possible range of fluctuation of the tax 
and would enable the Government, if It so desired, to redistribute 
income on a geographical basis. At present the largest amounts of 
cess are levied and spent in Kenya's most prosperous areas. 
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not be introduced at present. An efficient output control, given 
present knowledge of the industry, will therefore still require some 
direct control of capacity, but this does not need to be a system 
like the present one where the composition of capacity cannot be 
changed. The simplest way to ensure that national capacity remains 
at the desired level, while enabling growers to enter and leave the 
industry, is to provide a number of new acreage quotas in every period just 
sufficient to maintain total capacity at the desired level. To maximize 
the industry's efficiency it is essential that these quotas go 
to the potential growers with the lowest opportunity costs. This 
would tend to occur automatically if the tax level were set to equate 
the desired capacity of current and potential growers with the 
capacity necessary to produce the ICO quota output. Yet is would 
be impossible to maintain the tax at precisely the correct level, 
and furthermore a tax at this level would most likely lead to a 
less efficient industry than a tax level which generates an excess 
demand for new acreage quotas. This becomes evident if we examine 
the qualitatively alternative levels of tax where the supply of new 
quotas necessary to maintain the production of the ICO quota exceeds 
or is equal to their demand. 
If supply exceeds demand, this indicates a low estimated 
level of net profitability, and insufficient capacity will be 
drawn into the industry to satisfy the basic objective of producing 
the ICO quota. In addition this may indicate that returns to some 
of the present marginal growers are insufficient to enable them to 
maintain the necessary basic expenditure on field maintenance. As a 
result these marginal growers would become progressively less 
efficient, causing the industry as a whole to become less efficient 
and pushing its output further below the desired level. An excess 
supply of quotas would thus indicate that the rate of tax was too 
high, 
A similar argument applies when the demand for and supply 
of quotas is equal. Assuming a wide range of efficiency levels among 
growers, there will be some of marginal efficiency who, although not 
leaving the industry in the short - run, will be unable to maintain the 
necessary expenditure on field maintenance and as a result of the 
subsequent loss in efficiency, will eventually be forced to withdraw. 
The resulting loss in output would require a reduction in the 
tax rate to attract new acreage into the industry to bring capacity back 
back up to the desired level. As this acreage was not attracted 
to the industry at the previous higher tax rate, some of it may 
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be less efficient (taking present and future discounted opportunity 
costs) Than the marginal acreage which was forced to withdraw 
because of the old rate. The acreage which withdrew was marginal 
only in the sense that growers could not afford to maintain an adequate 
level of expenditure on field maintenance. Even if their expenditure cm 
field maintenance was originally only slightly below the adequate 
level, the cumulative loss of efficiency resulting from the cycle 
of lower returns followed by a lower level of field maintenance 
and even lower returns would have forced eventual withdrawal. It 
is likely therefore that some new entrants able to survive at the 
new lower rate of tax may be less efficient than those forced in the 
long-run to withdraw under the old high rate. A tax rate set 
at the level which equates the short-run supply and demand for new 
quotas is therefore likely to lead to a sub-optimal allocation of 
acreage under coffee. 
The tax level needs therefore to be below the level 
at which the quotas are just taken up. Growers who are less 
efficient than potential growers should be encouraged to leave the 
industry, but the long-run efficiency of growers who, although less 
efficient than the average, are more efficient than potential entrants 
must be reduced as little as possible. Precise specification of the 
tax would required much more research, particularly on the opportunity 
costs of the less efficient grower.8 However, a tax set below the 
rate at which all new quotas are taken up would be a substantial 
Improvement upon the present arbitrary and rigid system. Comparatively 
small and cheap samples of the costs of growers who are considering up-
rooting at any particular time should give a much clearer guide to 
9 the appropriate tax level. 
8, Existing cost data is almost entirely for experimental 
or 'ideal' estates and smallholdings. 
9. For example, K£20,ooo spent in 1970 on the collection 
of such data would have been euqal to only 0.1% of the marketed 
value of the 1970 coffee crop. 
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If for maximum efficiency the demand for new quotas is kept 
higher than the supply, some method must be found to allocate the 
quotas to those with the potentially lowest opportunity costs. Since 
the potential growers with the lowest opportunity costs should be 
prepared to pay the highest prices for permission to grow coffee, 
a method which allocates the new quotas to those prepared to pay 
the highest price should ensure that the quotas go to those with 
the lowest opportunity costs. It is unlikely that an auction system 
could achieve this. There seems to be no rational grounds for 
allocating the quotas on a regional basis, and it is unlikely that 
a single national auction would be feasible due to the wide geographical 
dispersion of growers. The alternative is a system of tendering. 
The simplest system of tendering for new quotas would be 
for the Coffee Marketing Board to announce a price for new quotas 
and invite applications for them. The disadvantage of this method 
is that the offer will be either over or under subscribed unless the 
Board is able to estimate the exact price at which all the quotas 
will be taken up. If the offer is under subscribed, a new offer 
must be made for total acreage to be maintained at the desired 
level. If the original offer is oversubscribed, the new acreage 
must be rationed, and it is unlikely that all the acreage would go 
to the most efficient potential growers. An alternative would be for 
each interested grower to send a bid to the Board giving a price per 
acre for a specific number of acres. The Board would allocate the 
acreage to the highest bidders charging them the price which they bid. 
Such a system would also have serious disadvantages. Firstly, it 
introduces a gambling element into the bidding process since each 
grower must weigh the risk of not receiving any new acreage against 
the benefits of receiving it at a lower price. Secondly, by 
allowing only a single bid, a grower must decide on one price and 
acreage instead of stating the acreages which he would like 
at different prices. Growers may therefore have preferred a larger 
acreage at the lowest bid price accepted by the Board, or conversely, 
having bid too low for a large acreage, may have been prepared to bid 
the accepted price for a smaller acreage. Thirdly, growers may well 
be disturbed to find that they paid more for their new acreage than their 
neighbour. A multiple bid system would eliminate these disadvantages. 
Instead of tendering with a single bid, the Board could quote a range 
of prices and invite growers to state the number of additional acres 
they would be willing to purchase at each price. The Board could 
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then add up the acreage bid for aT each price and choose the price at which 
the total acreage bid for equals the desired increases. Each grower 
would be allocated the quota for which he bid at this price. This system 
would eliminate all the disadvantages of single bid tendering. Tenders 
could be made on an annual basis or at times considered to be most 
convenient by the Board. This system should not be difficult for 
estates, and tendering by smallholders could be organised through their 
co-operative, which would collect and submit their bids. 
This system, based on multiple-bid tendering for new acreage 
quotas and a flexible tax on output adjusted to keep growers' profitability 
as stable as possible from year to year, should bring about a more 
efficienT allocation of acreage under coffee and a more efficient use 
of this acreage, resulting in the production of the desired national 
coffee output at a lower opportunity cost'. 
THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM ON EMPLOYMENT AND NET FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
Our discussion of the effects of the proposed system has 
been centred on changes in efficiency measured in' terms of changes in 
growers' opportunity costs, and these are likely to differ from 
opportunity costs considered in national terms. An evaluation of the 
impact of the new system on the national economy requires qualitative 
data on the divergence between the private and social costs and benefits 
of coffee growing, which in turn, requires empirical data on the 
extent of market imperfections and a weighted set of national economic 
objectives. As neither of these is available, no such comprehensive 
evaluation can be made. We can, however, move towards such an 
evaluation by considering the impact of the proposed system on those 
variables with the greatest likely divergence between private and 
social costs, As coffee is Kenya's largest single export and a 
major source of employment we choose to examine the impact on net foreign 
exchange earnings and on the national level of employment opportunities-
The value of foreign exchange will not.be the same for the grower 
and for the nation when, at the ruling exchange rate, shortage of 
foreign exchange is a constraint on national economic growth. The 
cost of labour will not be the same for the nation when wage rates do 
not reflect opportunity costs and when employment is valued by the 
nation as an end in itself: 
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The impact of the proposed system on both employment 
and net foreign exchange earnings depends essentially on which 
acreage from which sector of the industry is withdrawn and which 
new acreage is introduced. We showed earlier, that the present 
acreage quota system tends to protect inefficient growers who have 
quotas while frustrating the entry of those potentially more 
efficient. Under the suggested system, those with the highest 
opportunity costs will tend to leave the industry and be replaced 
by those with lower opportunity costs. 
More estate coffee is grown in areas which for reasons of 
climate and soil type are not particularly suited to coffee, 
but these areas also tend to be less suitable for other crops, 
whereas in most of the smallholder coffee areas attractive 
alternative crops exist. For other reasons, however, it is likely 
that there would be a net mc~Te of acreage from the estate to the 
smallholder sector. Firstly, smallholders who use a large element 
of family labour and grow mixed crops have a different cost structure 
from estates who use hired labour and normally concentrate on the 
production of coffee. For example, smallholder supplementary family 
labour resulting from troughs in the aggregate labour demand pattern 
will be valued at a much lower level than the rate which estates must 
pay for their unionised labour. In addition, labour employed by small-
holders on a wage basis is normally paid at a lower rate than labour 
employed by estates. For example, unionised labour (taking a mix 
of 50 men and 30 women) was paid an average of shs.3.15 per day in 
1968j1^ whereas the most frequent rate of remuneration on 
smallholdings was between shs. 1,50 and shs. 2.00 per day."*"^  
10. Kenya Coffee Growers Association, "Coffee Growing Expenses -
General Information", October 1968, Nairobi, Figures based on the 
rates of the Industrial Court Award, Dec. 1965. 
11. J.Heyer, D. Ireri, J, Morris, "Rural Development in Kenya -
a Survey of Fourteen .-Districts with Recommendations for Intensified 
Development", Institute for Development Studies, University College, 
Nairobi, Oct., 1969, The survey was carried out. in mid 1968. 
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Many Inputs, such as mulching material, which have to be produced 
or brought in specifically for coffee growing on estates may be by -
products of one of the other activities of the smallholder, In 
effect, estates must pay more for labour than its opportunity cost and 
12 
lose by being over specialised. The second reason for a likely net 
move from the estate to the smallholder sector is that there is a 
greater potential for smallholder expansion than estate due to the 
present structure of land ownership ana use, There are few large areas 
of suitable land which could be conveniently converted into estates , 
but there are many small pockets of land already owned and cultivated 
by smallholders in areas suitable for coffee. Under the suggested 
system, therefore, it is likely that there would be a net drift of 
production capacity from estates to smallholdings. 
The effect of this drift on employment levels depends on the 
relative labour intensiveness of coffee growing in the estate and 
smallholder sectors, and on what activities would replace or be 
replaced by coffee growing. Although smallholders tend to use 
their labour less efficiently and as a result tend to employ more 
labour per acre of coffee, the effect of the drift may not increase 
overall employment. This is because the alternative food crops 
which can be grown in much of the smallholder coffee areas tend to 
13 
be slightly more labour Intensive than coffee, whereas the alternative 
to coffee in some of the drier estate areas may be rancing which is 
12. Eelshaw and Hal] point out these differences in cost 
structure and show how the comparatively low level of purchased in-
puts makes coffee output very attractive to the smallholder by giving 
iij.ni a large cash surplus derived from coffee sales over purchased 
inputs. It is possible that the smallholder may be affected to a 
certain extent by some kind of 'money illusion', but it would seem 
more apt to look at coffee as an integral part of smallholder production. 
Coffee can then be viewed as being attractive because it forms 
part of an overall production package in which coffee and the other out-
puts are all more attractive when produced together than when produced 
singly, because the by-products of the other outputs have an enhanced 
value as inputs into coffee. Because these by-product inputs of 
coffee (e.g. surplus family- labour, manure and maize stover) are 
produced within the smallholding 3 the smallholder experiences their 
true low opportunity cost and coffee becomes an attractive element in the 
package of crops. 
13. A.R.Water, "The Cost Structure of the Kenya Coffee Industry 11, 
PhD Thesis, Rice University, Houston, 1969, p 128 
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considerably less labour intensive, The effect of the suggested system 
on employment levels cannot be determined any further without more 
detailed empirical evidence. 
The likely effect on net foreign exchange earnings of the drift 
of acreage under coffee from the estate to the small sector can be 
described with more certainty. This will be a function of the quantity 
and quality of coffee exported and the value of imported inputs. As 
a result of the International Coffee Organisation quota system, the 
quantity of exports tends to be fixed in any particular year apart 
from a small element of sales to non-quota markets. The value of 
sales to non-quota markets depends on both the quantity and quality 
of coffee exported, whereas the value of sales to the more important 
quota markets depends on the quality of coffee only, as the quota is 
expressed in terms of quantity. As smallholders consistently produce 
better quality coffee than estates, the drift to smallholder production 
would increase gross foreign exchange earnings. Estates tend to use 
more imported inputs per acre than smallholders, the most important 
of which are chemical fertilisers, sprays and machinery. The drift 
should therefore lead to an improvement in net foreign exchange 
14 
earnings. 
CONCLUSION 
The present system of taxation and control of the Kenyan 
coffee industry is likely to be perpetuating a sub-optimal allocation 
of acreage under coffee. A reallocation of this acreage would allow 
production of the total coffee output at a lower opportunity cost. 
The necessary reallocation could be achieved at a comparatively low 
administrative cost using a flexible output tax and a system under 
which growers could tender for the right to plant new coffee. Although 
the effect on employment levels of the resulting more, efficient 
allocation of acreage is indeterminate, it should result in an 
increase in net foreign exchange earnings. 
14. For this not to happen, the new smallholdings and the 
estates going out of production must behave very.differently from 
other growers in their sector with regards to both imported inputs 
and the quality of their output. Even if they do behave differently 
there is likely to be a compensating effect. Thus, if.estates 
going out of production used fewer imported inputs than the average 
estate as is likely, it is also likely that the quality of their output 
was correspondingly lower. Conversely, new smallholders, who may 
spend more on imported sprays etc. than average, are likely to 
produce coffee of even higher quality than the average smallholder. 
IDS/DP/185 
